Sri Aurobindo
Autobiographical Notes
and Other Writings of Historical Interest
Part Three. On Indian and World Events 1940–1950
2. Notes and Letters to the Editor of Mother India 1949–1950
On the Kashmir Problem1
Now let us come to your article. All you have written
up to the X mark against the beginning of a para is very good and needed to be
said; but after that there are certain things to which I have to take objection.
For instance, why suggest a slur on the whole Mohammedan population of Kashmir
by speaking of “fanatic spell of the name of Allah”? This cannot apply to the
Kashmiris who follow Abdullah and who are in a large majority, they are for his
idea of a secular state. The others in Gilgit and elsewhere are not actuated by
religious fanaticism but by political motives. The rest of the sentence should
be modified accordingly; the people in the districts who have been rescued from
the grip of the rebels have shown strong gratitude for their release and it
would be quite impolitic to ignore by such doubts the sincerity of this
gratitude. I am not enamoured of your idea of an understanding between Pakistan
and India, it is not likely that the Pakistan Government will consent to any
understanding except one which will help to perpetuate the partition and be to
their advantage. It would be most dangerous to forget Jinnah’s motive and policy
in establishing Pakistan which is still the motive and policy of the Pakistan
leaders,– although it would not be politic to say anything about it just now. If
you keep what you have written it should be with the proviso, if there is a
change of heart and if Pakistan becomes willing to effect some kind of junction
with India or some overtopping Council of cooperation between the two
federations. But the most amazing thing is your disastrous suggestion of a
coalition Government between the loyalists and the rebels in Kashmir. That would
give a position and influence and control over all the affairs of the State to
the supporters of Pakistan which they can never hope to have under the present
circumstances. They would be able to appoint their own men in the
administration, use intimidation and trickery in order to press people to vote
against their will and generally falsify 
the
plebiscite, and they certainly would not hesitate to do all that they could for
that end. It might very well knock all the good cards out of Abdullah’s hands
and smash up his present predominant chances of a favourable issue of the
plebiscite.
There is a passage in your article containing a trenchant suggestion which has puzzled me. You seem to say that India has been beaten on the military ground in Kashmir and there is no hope of her keeping it or clearing out the invaders; her last chance is the plebiscite and that is the reason why she is insisting on the plebiscite. Is that at all true? It would mean that Indian military strength is unable to cope with that of Pakistan and then, if she cannot cope with it in Kashmir in spite of her initial advantage, can she do it anywhere? If she gives up Kashmir because of her military weakness that encourages Pakistan to carry through Jinnah’s plan with regard to the establishment of Muslim rule in Northern India and they will try it out. I don’t think this is really the case. It was for political motives, I take it, and not from a consciousness of military weakness that India did not push her initial advantage, and she insisted on the plebiscite, not because it was her last or only chance but because it gave her the best chance. In a plebiscite on the single and straight issue of joining either Pakistan or India she was and is quite confident of an overwhelming majority in her favour. Moreover, she does not cling to the plebiscite from motives of ideological purity and will even refuse it if it is to be held on any conditions other than those she has herself clearly and insistently laid down. She is quite prepared to withdraw the case from the cognizance of the U.N.O and retain Kashmir by her own means and even, if necessary, by fight to the finish, if that is unavoidable. That Patel has made quite clear and uncompromisingly positive and Nehru has not been less positive. Both of them are determined to resist to the bitter end any attempt to force a solution which is not consistent with the democratic will of the Kashmir people and their right of self-determination of their own destiny. At the same time they are trying to avoid a clash if it is at all possible.
One thing which both Abdullah and the India Government
want to avoid and have decided to resist by all possible means 
is a partition of Kashmir, especially with Gilgit and Northern
Kashmir going to Pakistan. This is the greatest danger but the details and the
reasons for the possibility of its materialising, though they are plain enough,
have to be kept confidential or, at any rate, not to be discussed in public. But
if you take account of it, it will be easier to understand the situation and the
whole policy of the India Government. That at least is the stand taken by them
and the spirit of the terms they have laid down for the conditions of the
plebiscite. These conditions have been just at this moment published in the
newspapers and the whole course of negotiations with the U.N.O. Kashmir
Commission has been laid bare in a public statement. Practically, the Commission
representative has conceded on its part almost all the essential demands and
conditions laid down by Nehru. All, however, remains fluid until and unless the
Security Council acquiesces in the arrangements proposed by their own Commission
or else take a different decision and until the plebiscite Administrator is
appointed and makes the final arrangements. What will finally transpire from all
this lies as the Greeks used to say on the knees of the Gods, theōn en
gounasi keitai. It lies also with the reactions of the Pakistan leaders
which are more easily calculable, but may not show themselves until a possibly
much later date.
In any case, it seems to me that our only course is to support the India Government in the stand they are taking in regard to Kashmir and the terms and conditions they have made, so long as they do not weaken and deviate from their position. Nothing should be said which would discourage the public mind or call away the support which the Government needs in maintaining the right course. What I have written on Kashmir is only my personal view at present based on the information I have and must be kept quite private. But it may perhaps be of some help to you in determining what you may say or not say about Kashmir.
Since the above was written there has appeared
Pakistan’s interpretation of the Commission’s arrangement for the plebiscite. It
looks as if Lozano had made his statements as smooth as possible to either party
so that they got very different impressions of what was meant to be done.
However 
there is only one important point and
that is about the Azad armies. If these are allowed to remain in arms in the
places they now occupy the plebiscite will become a farce. But the India
authorities seem to have received a definite promise from Lozano that it will be
otherwise. We shall have to wait and see what will be the definite arrangements
and how the Commission will get out of this imbroglio. But Pakistan in this
matter is showing a mentality that makes one wonder whether it is worth while
your suggesting the possibility of an amicable rapproachment between the two
parts of partitioned India such as you have gone out of your way to elaborate in
your article.
c. September 1949
1 This letter was written around the same time as the letter to Kailas Nath Katju (see above, previous subsection). The article of Sethna’s to which Sri Aurobindo referred is no longer available.