Sri Aurobindo
Karmayogin
Political Writings and Speeches — 1909-1910
Karmayogin: A Weekly Review
Saturday 9th October 1909 — No.16
Nationalist Work in England
We publish in this issue an article by Sj. Bepin1 Chandra Pal in which he suggests the necessity of a Nationalist agency or bureau in England, and states the reasoning which has led him to modify the views formerly held by the whole party on the inutility of work in England under the present political conditions.
Bepin2 Babu has been busy, ever since his departure from India, in work of this kind and it goes without saying that he would not have engaged in it or persisted in it under discouraging circumstances, if it had not been borne in on him that it was advisable and necessary.
At the same time, rightly or wrongly, the majority of our party still believe in the concentration of work into the effort to elicit and organise the latent strength of the nation, and cannot believe that work in England at present is anything but hopeless and a waste of money and energy.
We freely admit that under certain circumstances an agency in England might become indispensable.
That would certainly be the case if an elective body with substantial but limited powers were established in India and serious differences of opinion were to arise between the Government and the popular representatives.
But such a state of things is yet remote, and the reformed councils will certainly not be such a body.
At present, what will such a bureau or agency do for the country?
Bepin3 Babu suggests that it may supply the British public with correct information so as to stem the tide of unscrupulous or prejudiced misinformation pouring into England through Reuter and other Anglo-Indian sources, and that, if the British public get correct information, they will at once put a stop to the policy of repression.
We confess, our impression is the reverse,— that however correct the information we supply, the British public as a whole — we do not speak of just and open-minded individuals,— will still prefer to put confidence in the mis-statements of their own countrymen rather than in the true statements of what they believe to be an inferior 
race indebted to them for any element of civilisation it may now possess.
Our impression is that even a correct idea of the facts would not necessarily lead to a correct appreciation and policy based on those facts; — many political and psychological factors would interfere.
If we are to change our opinion, it must be either as the result of new experience showing the effect of agitation in England or of new reasoning correcting the imperfections of our old premises and conclusions.
The only fact that seems to be in favour of a readjustment of our views, is the energetic campaign in Parliament of Mr. Mackarness and his friends for the release of the deportees.
It is alleged that, but for the untoward incident of the Curzon-Wyllie murder, some if not all the deportees would by this time have been released.
We have our doubts about this conclusion.
Sir Henry Cotton and some of his colleagues were always ever-hopeful about the effect of their pressure, and their expectations were more than once disappointed.
No ministerial pronouncement ever lent any colour to their idea that the release was imminent when the assassination happened.
All that the Government had promised, was to consider the question of the deportees' farther detention, in the usual course, on the presentation of the six-monthly report, a consideration usual without any Parliamentary agitation.
The discomfort of the questions was, no doubt, great and the long-established sentiment of many Liberals and not a few Conservatives was offended by the long detention of public men without a trial.
But this in itself, though it strewed the path of the deporters with thorns instead of its being, as they would have liked, strewn with roses, would not, by itself, have secured the release of the deportees.
Even if it had, the release of one or two or more of the deportees would not have removed the policy of repression.
Only the repeal of the Act could have done that, and it must have been followed by the eradication of executive illegalities and police harassment as well as of the readiness of Government to pass repressive legislation, before the real obstacles in the way of peaceful progress could be removed.
Would an agency in England seriously help towards such a consummation,— that is the question.
It means the diversion of money and effort, and we must see a reasonable 
chance of a return before we embark on it.
Bepin4 Babu urges that it will, and bases his conception on a certain reading of the British character and policy which we hesitate to endorse in its entirety.
It is quite true that we have heard of certain irresponsible Englishmen longing for a violent outbreak on the part of the people, which would give them an excuse for equally violent measures to crush Indian aspirations for ever.
But we do not believe for a moment, that some of the responsible officials,— and that we believe is all Bepin5 Babu implies,— cherished the same idea.
We think that all Government officials have regarded the outbreak of Terrorism, small though it was, with alarm and the utmost anxiety to get rid of it, and indeed we believe the institution of organised repression to have been the result of an ignorant and unreasoning alarm which hugely exaggerated the dimensions and meaning of the outbreak, as well as wholly misunderstood the drift of the Nationalist movement.
We take exception also to Bepin6 Babu's suggestion of the bully in the British character being responsible for the repressions, as if it were something peculiar to the British race.
What Bepin7 Babu wishes to indicate by this phrase, the readiness to use repression and what are erroneously called strong measures, to intimidate a popular movement, is a tendency which belongs not to British character especially but to human nature, and should be considered the result not of character but of the position.
The Government in India favour repression because it seems the only way of getting over what they regard as a dangerous movement, without concessions which mean the immediate or gradual cessation of their absolute paramountcy.
It is a case of incompatible interests, and until both parties can be brought to a modus vivendi, such it will remain.
How is that incompatibility to be surmounted, for, at first sight, it seems to be an insurmountable obstacle.
Bepin8 Babu relies on the enlightened self-interest of the British people and to a certain extent on their civilised conscience.
We think we may as well leave the civilised conscience out of the reckoning for the present.
The civilised conscience is a remarkably queer and capricious quantity, on which, frankly, we place no reliance whatever.
It is very sensitive to breaches of principle by others and very indignant when the 
same breaches of principle are questioned in its own conduct.
It sees the mote in other eyes; it is obstinately unaware of the beam in its own.
It is always criticising other nations, but it ignores or is furious at criticism of its own.
It has fits of sensitiveness in which it makes large resolutions, but it can never be trusted to persist in them contrary to its own interests.
This civilised conscience is not peculiar to the British people, but belongs in a greater or less degree to every European nation with the possible exception of Russia.
We prefer infinitely to rely, if we have to rely on anything, on the sense of enlightened self-interest.
Here also we differ from Bepin9 Babu.
He argues as if the British were a thoughtful and clear-minded people, and only needed the data to be correctly placed before them in order to understand their interests correctly.
This is far from the truth about British character.
The English are, or were, a people with a rough practical common sense and business-like regularity and efficiency which, coupled with a mighty thew and sinew and a bulldog tenacity and courage, have carried them through all dangers and difficulties and made them one of the first peoples of the globe.
They have had men of unsurpassed thought-power and clearness of view and purpose, but the race is not thoughtful and clear-minded; on the contrary on all questions requiring thought, intelligence and sympathy they are amazingly muddle-headed and can only learn by knocking their shins against hard and rough facts.
When this first happens, they swear profusely, rub their shins and try to kick the obstacle out of the way.
If it consents to be kicked out of the path, they go on their way rejoicing; otherwise, after hurting their shins repeatedly they begin to respect the obstacle, stop swearing and kicking, and negotiate with it.
In this process, familiar to all who have to do with Englishmen from the point of view of conflicting interests, there is much rough practical sense but little thought and intelligence.
It is on this conception of the British character that the Nationalist party has hitherto proceeded.
The hard fact of a continued and increasing boycott, an indomitable national movement, a steady passive resistance, have been the obstacles they have sought to present to the British desire for an absolute lordship.
We must prevent these obstacles from being kicked 
out of the way by repression, but the way to achieve that end is to show a tenacity and courage and a power of efficiency rivalling the British, and not to make an appeal to the conscience and clear common sense of the British public.
We could only imagine such an appeal having an effect in the as yet improbable circumstance of a Liberal Government with a small majority dependent for its existence on a powerful Socialist and Independent Labour Party.
Even if this should be the result of the approaching general elections, the appeal could not have effect unless the hard facts were there in strong evidence in India itself.
Our whole effort should be devoted to establishing these hard facts in a much more efficient and thorough way than we have hitherto done, and the only way is for the Nationalist party to establish its separate existence, clear from the drag of Moderatism on the one side and disturbance by ill-instructed outbreaks of Terrorism on the other, and erect itself into a living, compact and working force in India.
One day the Government in India will be obliged to come to the Nationalist Party, which it is now trying to destroy, for help in bringing about a satisfactory settlement of the quarrel between the bureaucracy and the people.
But that will not be till they have exhausted their hopes of achieving the same end on their own terms by playing on the weaknesses of the Moderate Party.
If the country were to follow the Moderate lead and content itself with the paltry and undesirable measure of reform now proposed, the progress of India towards self-government would be indefinitely postponed.
The Nationalist Party therefore, while showing all willingness to coalesce with the Moderates in the Congress on reasonable terms, must jealously guard their separate individuality and existence and decline to enter the Congress on terms which would make them an inoperative force and perpetuate the misbegotten creature of the Allahabad Convention Committee under the name of the Congress.
Nor should they be drawn into experiments in England which are, at present, of doubtful value or none.